Poynter Online - Organized Crime, the Army, and the Future of the Guatemalan People

By Jose Rub�n Zamora
Editor, El Periodico

Towards the end of the seventies and with counter-insurgence goals, the army implemented an organization comparable to the public finance apparatus, whose aim was to detect the import of war supplies (traffic of weapons and ammunition) destined for guerrilla movements in Guatemala.

As time went by, this organization comparable to the Ministry of Finance, extended its tentacles to invade other key government institutions that became the stage of successful criminal operations such as smuggling, theft of coffee containers, drug traffic, traffic of immigrants, car theft, kidnappings and bank hold-ups, among other far from orthodox activities.

This criminal organization has remained intact for more than two decades. Twenty years after inception, it has become a solid and vigorous institution, successfully surviving and overcoming two coup d'Etats, three attempted coups, one National Constitutional Assembly, five general elections, two popular consultations, the depuration of Congress and the Supreme Court of Justice, and in the last general elections, it democratically took over the Executive Power and presently has controls over every string of actual power.

In official terms, warfare in Guatemala ceased in 1996. However, the military war virtually terminated at the end of 1982. In any event, from 1982 to 1996, the official war served as a curtain of smoke, or umbrella, for this organization to convert the Government of Guatemala in a delinquent Government which, with absolute impunity, set out to assault the Guatemalan people.

Modernization, progress and development in Guatemala must inexorably experience the defeat of organized crime. To achieve this, major surgical modifications are required within the Army.The founders and architects of the sophisticated delinquent Government, which until this day steers and manages the life and assets of the Guatemalans, were Generals Manuel Antonio Callejas and Francisco Ortega Menaldo, Colonels H�ctor Montalb�n, Carlos Pineda Carranza and Hugo Tulio B�caro, subsequently joined by Officers Francisco Mar�n Golib, Roberto Letona and Jos� Rodr�guez S�nchez.

To achieve their ominous objectives, they used the support, the power and the infrastructure provided by the Army's Chief of Staff, the Bureau of Intelligence,the Bureau of Counterintelligence and the President's Chief of Staff.

This group of officers selected, from among its subordinates and promotion peers, permissive officers responsive to corruption, to occupy key positions within the Army and Public Administration. This enabled them to weave a web analogous to the overall structure of the State and, primarily to manage all of its delinquent actions with absolute impunity.

The de facto regimes of generals R�os Montt and Mej�a V�ctores,as well as the democratically elected governments of Cerezo and Serrano El�as,were the ideal complement for these criminal players to expand, adjust and improve their felonious organization within the State. Below are some examples:

de facto regime of General Efra�n R�os Montt

� General Manuel Antonio Callejas is appointed Director of Immigration, taking advantage of this position to infiltrate his comrades to the country's system of immigration, thus facilitating the illegal traffic of expatriates.

� General Francisco Ortega Menaldo -- who, under General Lucas Garc�a's regime, was in the Ministry of Finance -- was sent to Italy to undertake additional studies and was substituted by Colonel Giovanni Valerio C�rdenas, who reinforced the organization and indispensable contacts to keep smuggling under control and, thereby, tax evasion as well as drug traffic operations.

� General Francisco Mar�n Golib was assigned to the School of Kaibils -- Gunpowder -- where he established operational bases for drug traffic in Pet�n.

de facto regime of General Oscar Mej�a V�ctores

� Colonel Giovanni Valerio is substituted by General Roberto Letona Hora, who expands the organization and invites other comrades to join the network, including General Eduardo Ar�valo Lacs, Lieutenant Col. Ochoa Ruiz (sentenced to jail for drug traffic), Vice Admiral Miguel Posadas P�rez, Lieutenant Hugo Mor�n and Lieutenant Col. Jos� Luis Fern�ndez.

� General Carlos Pineda Carranza is appointed chief of the Bureau of Intelligence, used to provide the human resources required for military facade operations destined to cover up the group's felonious activities.

Government of Vinicio Cerezo Ar�valo

� General Manuel Antonio Callejas is designated Chief of Staff in the Army. This position enables him to appoint the most important people of the organization to hold key positions within the structure of the Armed Forces.

� General Ortega Menaldo is appointed Chief of Military Intelligence. In turn, he recruits individuals well-known for their lack of scruples and reproachable vocation, such as Col. Jacobo Esdr�s Salan S�nchez, General Morris de Le�n Gil, General �lvaro Leonel M�ndez Estrada, General Robin Macloni Mor�n Mu�oz, actual Minister of Defense, Major Napole�n Rojas M�ndez, Juan Guillermo Oliva Carranza, Leonel Vaidez and Lt. Cnl. Rolando D�az Barrios. A good assortment of the background, tricks and wrongdoings of these military-delinquent individuals were broadly documented and recorded in Remhi and reports of the Commission for Historical Clarification. Under the leadership of General Ortega Menaldo and with CIA resources, the Intelligence School was created, located in front of the facilities of the Civil Aeronautics Radar in Zone 13 and the Intelligence building of the Northern Air Base.

Jose Rub�n Zamora is the Editor of El Periodico.

At that time, the DEA was coordinating operations with the Bureau of Intelligence. This enabled the parallel power to obtain key information to expand drug trafficking throughout the country.

Further, with DEA and CIA support, General Ortega improved, with state-of-the-art technology, the surveillance systems to intercept telephone communications. This sophisticated equipment was installed at Mariscal Zavala Brigade and can be found in the buildings located at the end of the Sabana Arriba neighborhood, on the left side of the entrance to the brigade itself. The remaining telephone listening equipment is located at the place known as Aceituno, North of the Mariscal Zavala orchards. To this date, the equipment referred to is operated by the Presidential Staff for illegal espionage purposes on opponents and political dissenters, members of the international community, independent press, private sector leaders, human rights groups, among other outstanding and well-known members of Guatemala's society to the benefit of the regimes in office.

� General Francisco Mar�n Golib was first appointed as third commander of the President's Staff and later as commander of the President's Guards. He took advantage of these positions to assume control of La Aurora airport, facilitating air traffic of illegal foreigners and drugs.

� In the Public Finance field, General Letona Hora is substituted by Lt. Cnl. Hugo Mor�n Carranza, to perpetuate smuggling and drug traffic operations. However, during this period, the network makes a mistake in the course of drug transferring operations at La Aurora Airport. They failed to notice that the DEA had them under surveillance and are captured. They blame a certain Lt. Minera, who was under the orders of Mar�n Golib and Mor�n Carranza. Minera is dismissed and Mor�n is transferred to another command.

� During this period, the felonious Network recruits and robust group of officers, including Reserves Major Byron Barrientos, Generals Oscar Alfredo Cruz L�pez, Julio Alberto Soto Bilbao, Edgar Alfredo Trujillo Salguero, Morris Eugenio de Le�n Gil, Colonels Luis Alberto G�mez Guillermo, Sergio Hugo C�rdenas Sagastume, Roy Dedet Castrowitz, �lvaro Reyes Garc�a, Jorge Armando Mart�nez Cantoral, Mario Enrique G�mez Ayala and Ra�l Emilio Castillo Ovando, and a long list of military officers not included here due to the lack of space available to name all of them.

� This was the most fruitful period in terms of recruitment, because the control of the Chief of Staff in Defense and the Bureau of Intelligence was adequate for the affiliation of cadres throughout the hierarchical scale of the armed forces institution.

� To control air space, General Callejas y Callejas appoints as 2nd Commander of the Southern Air base, General Mario Ren� Sili�zar Gir�n, who at present is the Vice-Minister of Defense, seeking to establish control over landing strips along the coast. He is subsequently transferred to the Northern Air Base with the same mission. This enables the felonious network to facilitate drug traffic by air and by land as well as the transferring of undocumented individuals.

� At the end of Vinicio Cerezo's term, General Callejas y Callejas has influence on the appointment of General Ortega Menaldo as Chief of Presidential Staff of the newly elected President Serrano El�as.

Government of Jorge Serrano El�as

� General Ortega Menaldo achieves ratification of the appointment of General Callejas y Callejas, already retired, as Director of Customs. Callejas y Callejas virtually invades the General Bureau of Customs with friends and relatives (particularly siblings) of officers attached to the network. For example, the brothers of C�rdenas Sagastume, Sal�n S�nchez, Bustamante Figueroa, Estrada Vel�squez, and Mar�n Golib, take the institution by assault. This enables the network to refine and lubricate the mechanisms of its far from orthodox activities.

� Arguments used to convince civilian Presidents to assign army men to hold key posts and positions in Public Finance, Customs and Immigration, were that such were basic institutions to help the Army detect, control and destroy logistical systems (money, equipment, weapons, ammunition, replacements) of guerrilla groups operating in the country.

� At this time, network members loyal to Ortega Menaldo, who were part of the Bureau of Intelligence, found in gangs a useful, easy-to-contact, and to convince, resource to carry out certain tasks under a criminal facade, thus preventing exposure and risks against network members.

� At the former Ambulatory Military Police General Julio Soto Bilbao comes to organize and direct the theft of luxury and all-weather vehicles.

� War Marine Commander Miguel Posadas P�rez is appointed to control the ports, giving him the responsibility of facilitating the transfer of drugs and illegal immigrants. At this time, Posadas establishes linkages with Julio Gir�n, with whom he continues at this date to develop business relations, to the extreme that he manages some of Gir�n's businesses at Puerto Quetzal. With this move �- Posadas at the front of the War Marine -- the network closes the loop of control over air, sea and land.

� With the downfall of Serrano El�as, the criminal Network virtually collapses. However, it is rescued by Enr�quez, Pineda Carranza and Col. Fern�ndez Ligorr�a.

Government of �lvaro Arz�

� Arz�'s regime represented difficult and risky times for the criminal network rooted in State institutions, particularly in the Army. A major figurehead �- Alfredo Moreno � of the felonious organization was captured and jailed. While searching through his home, conventional, digital and photographic files were found in his computers, covering all of the organization and the corresponding leaders. However, Arz� was timid and lacked the necessary courage to demand the necessary investigations to catch the leaders, as was due. He merely took some measures with mid-level military cadres that translated in dismissals from the Army of Lt. Cols. Jacobo Esdr�s Sal�n S�nchez, Rolando Augusto D�az Barrios, Juan Oliva Carrera, Luis Alvarado Batres and Major Napole�n Rojas M�ndez.
High authorities of the armed forces are under the absolute control of organized crime.
The only fat fish who mutually asked for retirement were Generals Roberto Letona Hora and General Ortega Menaldo, following the display of compromising photographs showing them with Moreno and other transgressors including Alfonso Portillo, who received money from the criminal network for his services as political analyst for the organization. Despite the fact that Arz� was aware of the tricks of these criminal masters, upon retiring from the Army, more than one was surprisingly rewarded.

Government of Alfonso Portillo

� Portillo's electoral victory meant the return of General Francisco Ortega Menaldo, Lt. Col. Jacobo Esdr�s Sal�n S�nchez and Major Napole�n Rojas M�ndez to the stage.

This trio of Satan's adopted children are the actual holders of power in Guatemala, facilitated by the total absence of Portillo's responsibility and scruples, his absolute lack of political capacity and uselessness as public negotiator, as well as obvious inclination for easy money and partying.

For these reasons, devoid of difficulties or obstacles, this felonious trinity �- Ortega, Sal�n and Rojas -� has appointed the high military command and all key Army cadres.

The neutralized withdrew or marginated officers that do not belong to or participate in the criminal network. They have left on the side and displaced all military officers who are not outlaws or thieves and, therefore, have refused to adhere to their interests. Slowly, they have taken over important positions. In practical terms, they have appointed all of the commanders, second and third commanders, with a view to having the armed forces respond to their deceitful interests: smuggling, drug traffic, car thefts, bank hold-ups, kidnappings, and illegal immigrants.

They have control over general orders. They make decisions on appointments, promotions, demotions and awards. They manage the budget of the armed forces, ignoring with cynicism the generalized criticism. With no shame or blushing, they have favored, launched and empowered transfers to the Army, and particularly to the Presidential Staff. Such transfers, by law, are not subject to audits and thus, are easy mechanisms to channel thousands of millions of quetzals to the pockets of some civilian officers who cover up their felonious businesses.

Most recent events

Statements made by Mr. Otto Reich, Undersecretary of State for the Western Hemisphere as well as by Mr. Paul Simons, Undersecretary of State for international drug-related issues, and by Mr. Rogelio Guevara, Chief of DEA operations, categorically confirm that the decisions and policies of Portillo's government were directly affected by smuggling and organized crime, particularly in the Ministries of Defense and of the Interior. Such overwhelming statements were cause of dissension, whimpering and, especially, changes in military commands. Nonetheless, nothing changed.

First, government authorities showed an unusual and uncommon concern over drug traffic; they developed some anti-drug operations with propaganda background, and finally, went to a situation of availability of the armed institution to Cols. Vaides Paiz, G�mez Ayala and Captain Calder�n Alfaro, all of them prominent members of the felonious Army network.

However, the displaced officers were substituted by others who are also members of organized crime. The changes represent more of the same, as shown in the case of the arrival of Col. Carlos Gayt�n Nufio, who is the Director of Intelligence as a result of the good services of Napole�n Rojas.

The infernal trinity of Ortega, Sal�n and Rojas, continues to hold the reins of power, and despite everything, they are the puppeteers.

Facing the electoral process, they pretend to clean Army rows and do away with any officer that might affect their political preferences, taking advantage of Portillo's promise to reduce the armed forces. Through the Presidential Staff they also manage relations with former Civilian Patrols (PACs) and psychological operations against their political opponents.

In any case, the strategy of the criminal network is to permeate and participate in all of the structures of the Army with their own people so as to ensure their survival should they be defeated in the elections of 2003.

Available options

The first option is to decrease, rationalize, cleanse and radically re-structure the Armed Forces. However, if such efforts are undertaken by the infernal trinity, through the high military leaders, one would simply turn 360 degrees to return to the same point of departure.

Consequently, Guatemala would sadly remain in the hands of the same individuals: Ortega, Sal�n and Rojas or undesirable clones of such sinister specimens. The only way to give sense to this option would be to appoint a commission to reduce, rationalize, cleanse and re-structure the Army with the participation of honorable members of the Armed Forces (active and retired), representatives of the overall Guatemalan society, representatives of human rights organizations in the country and representatives of Minugua who, as in the case of El Salvador, undertake an exhaustive and serious appraisal of the curriculum of each officer, and on the basis of such appraisal chose who remains in the institution. The second option would be through a constitutional reform, to simply abolish the Armed Forces.

If Guatemalans are unable to take either road, they will never be able to enjoy any kind of decent and civilized future, with peace, welfare and development.

This piece appeared in El Periodico on Nov. 12, 2002. It was translated from the original Spanish by Patricia Sole.

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